We have explored the extent of accrual-based and real activities-based earnings management using data from family and non-family firms in Japan. Family firms are expected to have lower agency costs because family shareholders and management are more congruent in their pursuit of mutual firm goals and seek lower levels of earnings management. However, this collusion may lead to entrenchment and higher levels of earnings management, which becomes opaque to outside shareholders. A founding family is concerned with the reputation of their firm for sustained socioemotional wealth and family firms may conduct cosmetic earnings management to conceal bad news. We empirically assess the levels of earnings management and investigate whether the level will be lower or higher for family or non-family firms, and identify which method is more costly. The level of accruals and cost may vary among the family firm types; that is, whether or not shareholdings are large or the CEO is from the founding family. We find that the level of both accrual-based and real activity measures is lower for family firms. With cross-section regressions, we find that family shareholding increase the level of abnormal accruals management, whereas the family CEO decreases the level of abnormal accruals, but in both cases the amounts were not significant. We also find that family-related variables decrease the levels of real-activities earnings management. When we introduce economic measures related to the costs of earnings management, we find that Japanese family firms utilize accrual-based earnings management more often than real activities-based earnings management. 
Introduction to Japanese Family Firms
Among the literature on earnings quality (Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001; Desai et al., 2004; Richardson et al., 2005) , few studies use US family firm data except for Ali et al. (2007) and Wang (2006) . Although the financial performance of family firms with Japanese data has been investigated by Claessens et al. (2000) , Allouche et al. (2008 ), Saito (2008 , Asaba (2013) , and Mehrotra et al. (2013) , few studies adopt the perspective of financial disclosure quality. Ebihara et al. (2012) find that the earnings quality of Japanese family firms is lower than that of non-family firms from univariate analysis using the Jones and modified Jones models and find that earnings quality is higher for family firms with founding family shareholdings of up to 33% using multivariate pooled regressions. However, the study's sampling period is limited to three years, and the study investigated only accrual-based earnings management. Kubota and Takehara (2013) find that family firms adopt more conservative earnings reporting than non-family firms.
In the current paper, we explore both accrual-based earnings management (hereafter AEM) and real activities-based earnings management (hereafter REM) of family firms in Japan using data from all family and non-family firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange from the year 2004 to the year 2011. We chose Japanese family firm data for our research for the following reasons. First, Bennedsen and Fan (2014) argued that Japanese family firms have a unique history and culture relative to other countries' family firms including those of other East Asian countries; this uniqueness provides motivation for research on Japanese family firms. Although earnings management for family firms has been investigated in detail (Prencipe et al., 2014) , the test sample is mainly limited to US and European firms with the exception of for Kim and Yi (2006) , who study Korean firms.
Although European family firms have a longer history than their US counterparts, the histories of Japanese family firms far surpasses those of European family firms and many date from the eighth century AD (the private family firms Kongo Gumi and Hoshi Ryokan, for example). Moreover, the management culture of family firms in Japan may be substantially different from the culture of European (Achleintner et al., 2014) and US family firms (Ali et al., 2007 and Wang, 2006) . Second, the proportion of Japanese public firms owned by families is approximately equal to the proportion of American firms owned by families. Among the large listed family firms in Japan are Toyota Motor Corporation, Panasonic, Kikkoman Corporation, and Epson. These multinational family firms have a strong influence on the Japanese and world economies. Accordingly, it is imperative for accounting researchers to explore the degree of earnings management of family firms versus non-family firms.
Third, we consider it important to explore whether the paternalistic Japanese management style (Itami, 2002) is still practiced among family firms versus non-family firms. If this is the case, management may be more concerned with the redistribution of revenue to their employees than the base-line net income. Because employees are sometimes considered family members of firms (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005) , we explore whether family firms in Japan are less subject to earnings management of net income.
Finally, the type of corporate governance structure of the majority of Japanese firms is conventional and defined in the Companies Act. At least one internal auditor and outside CPA firm are required to check board performance and the fair representation of financial statements. Another type of governance also defined in the Companies Act is committee style governance, for which three committees composed of board members and a CPA firm oversee the management performance and the fairness of financial statements, as in the US. However, few Japanese firms adopt this latter form of governance (Sony, for example). The generated income numbers for the former type of corporate governance may be subject to higher earnings management because board members and an internal auditor may function as insiders, and this tendency may be stronger among family firms.
Family firms are expected to have lower agency costs because family shareholders and management are more congruent in their pursuit of mutual firm goals by family shareholders and/or executive positions and seek a lower level of earnings management.
However, such collusion may lead to entrenchment, a higher level of earnings management, and outside shareholders may be excluded from the real situation.
A founding family will also be concerned with the reputation of their product/services, firm name, and family name to sustain family socioemotional wealth although this requires a level of sacrifice in economic performance.
1 Thus, in this case, we infer that the level of earnings management will be lower for family firms compared to non-family firms for reputational purposes, and we investigate the level of earnings management identifying which method is more costly for family firms. Family firms may conduct cosmetic earnings management and conceal bad news (Gomes-Mejia et al.,
2014).
We consider that the level of accruals and cost (Zang, 2012) may also vary among the type of family firm; that is, whether or not shareholdings are large and whether the CEO is from the founding family. We conduct empirical analyses using correlation 1 See Berrone et al. (2010 Berrone et al. ( , 2012 and Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007 for the definition of socioemotional wealth (SEW) used in family firm research literature. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2014) discuss the impact of the family control and influence dimension and the family identity dimension on the extent of earnings management.
analysis, portfolio analysis, univariate analysis, and cross-section regressions and find evidence to test these assertions.
Section 2 explains the motivation for our study, and Section 3 reviews previous studies. Section 4 establishes our hypotheses. Section 5 explains the data and reports basic statistics. Section 6 reports empirical results in detail, and Section 7 concludes.
Motivation for the Study
Family firms are typically fortified by management that is compatible with a family norm and/or value regardless of whether the CEO is a family member (Ward, 2004) .
Accordingly, we expect that management possesses stronger real authority inside firm organization, according to the definition of Aghion and Tirole (1997) . However, this force can function in one of two ways.
First, family firms may suffer less from agency cost problems that arise between managers and share owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) because a large portion of shares are owned by founding families, and the family CEO holds authority from the family. These factors provide greater efficiency with less agency cost. Anderson et al. (2009) note that family firms can provide stronger control and oversight with less agency cost and deliver direct control over corporate social activity decisions to managers. The authors call this strong tendency the "control in-place" hypothesis.
However, stronger authority may be counterproductive, and entrenchment may increase within the firm. Stronger authority with less agency cost may increase opaqueness in disclosures because management and the owner have less concern for other stakeholders. Thus, family firms may fall into a state of autarky, and non-family managers and employees in fear of losing their jobs may be defenseless against the firm.
For example, both Dyer and Whetten (2006) and Anderson et al. (2009) Additionally, from the perspective of preserving a family firm's socioemotional wealth (SEW), which is a new concept in family firm research literature, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007 argue that family firms are willing to yield financial performance to attain and preserve greater socioemotional wealth. The authors suggest that family firms are concerned with persistent positive profit, but do not necessarily maximize profits and may spend on social causes such as museum, charity and/or educational institution donations at the same time as investing in the well-being of company employees. In this case, net profit is not the ultimate goal.
Enforcing these management actions requires a stronger real authority (Aghion and Tirole, 2007) with lower agency cost, which might allow the quality of earnings to better maintain the reputation of the firm and the family or vice versa. 2 This can be a significant implication of our research framework. We establish our first null hypothesis to determine which story is consistent in Section 4.
To test our first hypothesis that compares the lower agency cost argument with the entrenchment effect, we focus on earnings quality. Earnings quality is one of the major properties that accounting reports ought to reflect (Ronen and Yarri, 2008 and Francis et al., 2006) , and the evidence for Japanese family business data is less known except in Ebihara et al. (2012) . To investigate the level of AEM, we use abnormal accruals as presented by Dechow et al. (1995) and other standard earnings quality measures from the accounting literature. We also investigate the level of REM as devised by Roychowdhury (2006) .
In our second hypothesis and the subsequent sub-hypothesis in Section 4, we compare family and non-family firms by highlighting various cost measures accompanied by both AEM and REM, which was first proposed and tested by Zang (2012) on US data. The authors' method compares the relative cost of earnings management. Achleitner et al. (2014) apply the same method to German family business data. The study sample is composed of 99 to 291 listed family firms spanning 11 years, and the authors find that family firms in Germany choose to employ AEM more than REM. Because the sample is composed of public firms, the results are comparable to ours. However, as the introduction suggested, Japanese family firms tend to have longer history, and the management culture may be unique (Bennedsen and Fan, 2014; Itami, 2002) ; thus, their behavior may be different from that of European family firms.
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In this paper, with minor modifications on the cost measures used by Zang (2012) in the context of Japanese firms, we compare the relative cost of two earnings management methods for family and non-family firms in Japan. This leads us to establish the second hypothesis and the sub-hypothesis defined in Section 4. We review previous studies related to this current study in the next section.
Previous Evidence on Family Firms' Earnings Management
Among the literature on earnings quality (Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001; Desai et al., 2004; Richardson et al., 2005) , few studies use US family firm data. Ali et al. (2007) find that US family firms show better quality financial disclosures, are followed by more analysts, and trade their stocks with smaller bid-ask spreads. Wang (2006) finds that earnings quality is higher for US family firms versus non-family firms. Similarly, Jiraporn and
DeDalt (2009) Taiwan family firm data, Yang (2010) finds the greater the share of insider ownership, the higher the level of earnings management. With respect to Korean data, Kim and Yi (2006) find that the greater the disparity between control (voting rights) and ownership (cash flow rights), the greater the extent of earnings management. The previous studies investigated only AEM, except Achleitner et al. (2014) . In the current paper, we explore both AEM and REM (Roychowdhurry, 2006 and Zang, 2012) and compare relative costs for three types of family firms, which we define in Section 5.
For the former earnings management measure, we decompose total accruals into normal and abnormal components using the CFO-modified Jones model proposed by Kasznik (1999) , and for the latter measure we use the method by Roychowdhury (2006) .
In one of the most widely cited research articles on Asian family business, Claessens et al. (2000) investigated ownership structure among East Asian countries for evidence on management behavior and financial performance of Japanese family firms.
The authors include 1,240 Japanese listed firms (op. cit., p.104) and note that 13.1% of firms are controlled by families with a 10% shareholding cutoff level for founding families, and 9.7% of firms are controlled by families with a 20% cutoff level. Saito In the accounting literature investigating Japanese firm earnings quality, Kubota and Takehara (2013) find that family firms adopt more conservative earnings reporting compared to non-family firms and report losses earlier using the Basu (1995) conditional conservatism regression model. Ebihara et al. (2012) find that earnings quality is lower for family firms than non-family firms with univariate analysis, but the quality is higher for founding-family shareholdings of up to 33% using multivariate analysis. However, this prior research is limited by the length of the sampling period (only three years) and the measurement of accruals-based earnings only.
Hypotheses
Based on the reasoning in Sections 2 and 3, we establish two hypotheses and one sub-hypothesis in this section. First, considering the robust real authority (Aghion and Tirole, 1997) and lower agency cost in family firms because of the close relationship between management and owners, we predict that family firms will be unwilling to boost their reported earnings and will have strong executing power not to do. Given real authority, management and owners are not concerned with manager compensation geared towards firm performance and will not engage in income-boosting strategies.
Given lower agency cost, the founding family and management with greater firm share may be more concerned with long-run value appreciation than non-family firms and may be less concerned with earnings performance in the short run. Additionally, with respect to the preservation motive to maintain socioemotional wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007 Berrone 2010 Berrone , 2012 of family firms, we predict that managers of family firms will not choose income-increasing earnings management practices because it will reduce the founding family firm reputation and, consequently, detract from the accumulation of family specific socioemotional wealth.
However, there may be a greater entrenchment effect by owners, management, and internal auditors from collusion. This can lead to a higher level of earnings management and exhibits strong real authority that is functioning in the opposite direction.
As a null hypothesis, we predict that the amount of earnings management in family firms is lower than that of non-family firms. We call this reasoning "founding family's reputation hypothesis" and establish our first hypothesis. 5 We call the alternative hypothesis the "entrenchment hypothesis."
Hypothesis 1: Family firms will conduct a lower level of income-increasing earnings management than non-family firms.
If the alternative hypothesis is supported, the cause may be the entrenchment effect arising from the collusion of management, family owners, and an internal auditor, and this phenomenon can be explained by a particular Japanese governance style. In such a case, managers and the founding family may extract more cash by compensating a family CEO and/or paying out higher dividends with inflated earnings. Management may incur higher expenditures for perks (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Outside shareholders, both current and future, may suffer from the income-boosting efforts of family firms. Stockmans et al. (2010) find such behavior in Flemish private family firms, and Kim and Yi (2006) find similar behavior in Korean private family firms versus public family firms. Our sample is composed of public firms in Japan, and our evidence will complement these prior findings whatever the direction.
The second hypothesis addresses the type of earnings management method that family firms in Japan pursue: AEM or REM.
Subsequent to Hypothesis 1, we predict that family firms sacrifice cost for earnings management because owners and/or family CEOs are (is) insider(s), do (does) not want to incur cost, and would rather conduct earnings management. Outside shareholders may place a high level of confidence on family management if the CEO is a family member. Family firms may consider that a family-member CEO avoids unnecessary expenditure to boost earnings unlike a non-family-member CEO, who may conduct earnings management to enhance their professional reputation. 6 We call this hypothesis the "earnings management cost hypothesis" for family firms because family firms avoid incurring real economic cost solely for income-boosting purposes.
Hypothesis 2: Family firms will sacrifice less economic cost through real earnings management to increase earnings than non-family firms
Then, given that Hypothesis 2 is accepted for family firms in Japan, we establish an additional sub-hypothesis as a corollary to Hypothesis 2 using the same reasoning that family firms do not want to sacrifice economic cost even in cases where they want to conduct earnings management. We call this the "accrual method choice hypothesis. "
Hypothesis 2.A: Family firms prefer accruals-based earnings management to real earnings management.
From the two hypotheses and sub-hypothesis, we explore the extent of earnings management and the cost differences for Japanese family firms.
Data and Variables Construction

Data
Our primary observation period is from the year 2004 to the year 2011, and the sample includes all listed firms on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The numbers of firm types in the sample are listed in Table 1 . We construct unbalanced panel data without survivorship and new firm bias. firms with more than 10% of shares owned by a founding family, but the CEO is not a family member, and Type 3: less than 10% of shares are owned by a founding family and the CEO is a family member. 7 Based on these classifications, and using a sample of non-family firms, we investigate the hypotheses 2 and 2A based on cost differences for these four types of firms (Zang, 2012 ).
The differences in family firm types may reveal distinct management and financial reporting behavior. The differences may depend on the size of the shareholding of the founding family and/or whether the CEO is a family member. The finding will provide new insight into the quality of earnings of Japanese family firms.
The first subpanel reports the number of observations for each year followed by the stock exchange listings and the sector-wise observations. This sector classification scheme follows that of Kubota and Takehara (2007) , who investigate the cost of capital in Japan. The details of this scheme are shown in Appendix 1. The first column lists the number of non-family firms; the second column, Type 1 firms (more than 10%, and a CEO from the founding family); the third column, Type 2 firms (more than 10%, and a CEO not from the founding family); the fourth column, Type 3 firms (less than 10%, and a CEO from the founding family); and the fifth, the total number of firms. For example, for 2011, there are 998, 426, 104, 152, and 1,680 firms.
The CEOs of Japanese family firms are often members of the founding family, even if the family shareholding is less than 10%. The data reveals that 9.62% of the firms conform to this Type 3, and we determine that there are more large firms (Toyota, for example) than small firms from the listings on different stock markets. This represents a unique phenomenon not found anywhere else in the world (Bennedsen and Fan, 2014) .
The phenomenon may come from a corporate culture whereby the employees respect that the descendant may have inherited the original entrepreneur's spirit, a reflection of historical traditions dating from medieval times, or a characteristic of Japanese management culture. However, this paper does not identify the reason because it may be a sociological paradigm.
We find that the number of family firms of all types increases over the years with a pace more rapid than that of non-family firms. For stock exchange listings, we find the largest listing is from other emerging stock markets in Japan with 261 firms and 82 firms for Type 1 and Type 2 firms, respectively. For Type 3 firms, we find the largest listing on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, with Toyota Motor Company and Panasonic in this category. For sector-wise observations, for Type 1 and Type 2 firms, the largest listing is from the service industry, whereas for Type 3 firms the largest listing is from the investment goods industry. Overall, we find that 42% of the firms are classified as listed family firms in Japan.
Measures of Earnings Management
For the sample firms, we use financial statement and stock price data from the Nikkei NEEDS Database and compute earnings numbers and managed numbers.
In this study, we define accruals (ACC) as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items (EBEI) and cash flow from operations (CFO). 8 First, we compute EBEI from the corresponding items on the income statement and obtain CFO directly from the cash flow statement. Because EBEI is equal to (CFO + ACC) by definition, accruals in this study are computed as EBEI -CFO.
We decompose total accruals into normal and abnormal components using the modified Jones model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995 In equation (1), ΔADJREV is the difference between changes in sales and accounts receivables, PPE is property, plant, and equipment measured at net book value, and ν j,t is a residual term. The fitted values from OLS estimation were used to construct normal accruals (NAC) components, and their residual terms were used as abnormal accruals (ABNAC). The abnormal accruals components represent firm-specific accrual components in excess of industry averages.
In addition to abnormal accruals, we use two other measures of accounting-based earnings quality measures -measures of variability and smoothness of earnings.
Variability of earnings (EBEISD) in this study is defined as the past five-year standard deviation of earnings before extraordinary items (EBEI). The "smoothness" measure is the ratio of the standard deviation of EBEI to the standard deviation of CFO. For measures to assess the level of REM, we follow the method employed by Roychowdhury (2006) , and the data construction method is almost identical. First, by conducting cross-sectional regressions for every industry and year, we compute abnormal cash-flows from operations, ABNCFO, which is defined as a residual term from the following regression model (2).
We also compute two additional measures of REM, abnormal production (ABNPROD) and abnormal expenditures (ABNEXP), by employing the following regression models (3) and (4) (2006), we computed two additional measures of REM: abnormal cost of goods sold and abnormal inventory growth. However, the Pearson correlation between abnormal production (ABNPROD) and abnormal cost of goods sold in our pooled sample is high at 0.916. Thus, we decided not to use abnormal cost of goods sold and abnormal inventory growth in the analysis and to focus on abnormal production (ABNPROD). 11 Appendix 2 shows the descriptive statistics for these earnings management measures.
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To measure accrual-based earnings quality (Francis et al., 2008) , we choose three variables, abnormal accruals (ABNAC), earnings variability (EBEISD), and smoothness.
Reported in the first row are the percentage of shares owned by the founding family, and the differences are all significant.
For abnormal accruals, the smallest is Type 3 firms at -0.053, although the difference with non-family firms is not significant. ABNAC for Type 1 family firms is also negative at -0.019. These results imply that the type of firms in which CEOs are founding-family members (Types 1 and 3) tend to decrease their earnings among all firm types, supporting Hypothesis 1 for these types of family firms.
However, for variability (EBEISD), non-family firms show the smallest value at 2.108 defined as the past five-year volatility of earnings, although the differences are not significant. Smoothness is measured by the ratio of variability to the standard deviation of cash flows from operations, and Type 3 firms have the highest number at 0.719, which shows the lowest earnings quality. However, we find that Type 2 firms show a lower number than other types of firms at 0.599, which implies higher earnings quality. For Type 2 firms, the managers are hired managers and perhaps more concerned with their own reputation as capable managers and/or their own empire building (Berk and DeMarzo, 2011) . We infer that Type 2 firms without family CEOs may be more concerned with stable earnings patterns to secure a stable and higher salary.
Overall, for the various measures of AEM for different types of family firms, we find that the level of earnings management is somewhat higher for family firms although not significant in all cases. Therefore, the evidence for AEM supports Hypothesis 1 at least for ABNAC.
For the measures of REM, the means of abnormal cash flows from operations (ABNCFO) of Type 1 family firms are higher than those of non-family firms, and the difference is statistically significant. In the case of abnormal production (ABNPROD), the means are lowest (negative) for both Type 1 and Type 2 firms at -0.018 and -0.007, respectively, and significantly. These results imply that Type 1 and Type 2 family firms utilize less REM.
Abnormal expenditures (ABNEXP) for these two types of firms are larger at 0.016 and 0.002, which implies that family firms expend more and do not conduct upward earnings management. The stronger real authority of family firms (Aghion and Tirole, 1997) may allow management to spend on necessary investment expenditure and employee compensations even to the extent of sacrificing profit.
Overall, except for abnormal expenditures, we find that Type 1 and Type 2 family firms use less REM than non-family firms and Type 3 firms. From the univariate analysis result for REM, we support Hypothesis 1, similar to the cases for AEM.
Because the size of Type 3 firms is large at 11.175 (see the rows of lnTA below) and these are listed firms, it is reasonable that Type 3 firms show a similar tendency to non-family firms as far as accrual-based and real activities-based earnings management are concerned.
In the lowest subpanels, we report the basic financial characteristics of our sample.
Size (lnTA: Natural logarithm of total assets) is used as a dummy variable in cross-section regressions, and the other four variables are also used as control variables.
That is, ROA: Past five-year average return on equity, LEV: A firm's financial leverage defined as non-current liabilities to total assets, SLSG: Past five-year growth rate of sales, and LP: Labor productivity defined as value added per employee. The return on assets (ROA) is highest for Type 1 family firms at 1.787% followed by Type 3 firms at 1.637%. Leverage is lowest for Type 2 firms at 12.584%. Sales growth (SLSG) is higher for Type 2 family firms at 1.106%, but the difference is not significant. Labor productivity (LG) for non-family firms is higher than all types of family firms at 23.887 million yen and is an interesting result.
Costs of Earnings Management
We analyze the costs of earnings management in Section 6 and use the following variables as surrogates for the cost of earnings management. We follow Zang (2012) and, particularly, three variables each for AEM and REM. We use similar variables as Zang because US and Japanese GAAP and their disclosure regulations based on Sarbanes and Oxley type laws are more similar to each other than to European country ones with IFRS standards.
That is, we use a dummy variable for the selection of a large auditing firm (Big Four in the Japanese case) or not, the number of following analysts (Athanasakou et al., 2011) , and the length of operating cycle as a cost of AEM. The rationale is as follows:
1) The larger the auditors, the more difficult it is to avoid adhering to Japanese GAAP to conduct earnings management, 2) The greater the attention the firm receives from analysts and the media, the more difficult it is to conduct earnings management, and 3)
The longer the operating cycle as measured by the turnover of accounts receivables, the easier it is to use less stringent credit policy for sales.
To measure the cost of REM, the latter, we use market share (Harris, 1998) distance to default (Merton, 1974 and Gray et al., 2006) using the Merton European option pricing model by measuring the distance to the default boundary (standard deviations divided by the means of the geometric Brownian motions) at the end of one year and the effective marginal tax rates (Graham, 1996 and Scholes et al., 2002) . We use the weight of firm sales figures over industry sales to compute market shares based on Nikkei mid-industry classifications. To estimate the distance to default for individual firms, we employ the method proposed by Vassalou and Xing (2004) . The method to compute the effective tax rates follows Graham (1996) and Kubota and Takehara (2007) and is computed using 10,000 simulation paths for 20 years. We use these proxy variables for cost because 1) the larger the market share, the stronger the market-leader power of a firm and its ability to boost sales; 2) the closer the boundary of bankruptcy, the more difficult it is to overproduce or oversell, and 3) the higher the effective tax rate, the higher the extra marginal tax cost to boost earnings.
Empirical Results
Analysis of Family Shares and CEO Positions
In this sub-section, we investigate how ownership affects earnings management behavior and whether it matters if the CEO is a founding-family member. However, it is a pair-wise analysis, and we do not control for other factors that may affect these variables. Therefore, the evidence is temporary.
In the case of the CEO dummy variable shown in Panel B, we do not find significant differences in AEM. However, for REM, we find the abnormal production cost (ABNPROD) is lower at -0.010 when the CEO is a family member. We suggest that family-member CEOs do not execute overproduction to increase profit. Abnormal expenditures (ABNEXP) are higher in cases where the CEO is a family member (0.010 versus -0.008), and this augments the previous finding. So far, the evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 1. Table 3 .
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The second to the upper-most right column reports the difference between the highest share-owned group (P1) with more than 50% minus the lowest group (P5) with less than 10% owned, and the upper-most right column shows the corresponding p-values.
For this difference in variable (P1 to P5), the values are -0.448, 0.320, and -0.024 for abnormal accruals (ABNAC), earnings variability (EBEISD), and smoothness, respectively. Thus, earnings are decreased to a greater extent and earnings variability becomes higher as more shares are owned by founding families. This finding is consistent with our previous findings in Tables 2 and 3. In case of REM, abnormal production costs (ABNPROD) is smallest at -0.017 in P1 in which FFO is greater than 50% while abnormal expenditures (ABNEXP) are positively correlated.
In sum, the result from the ranked portfolio test is consistent with the previous result shown in Tables 2 and 3 both for AEM and REM. Also, note that the shares owned by the founding family are negatively related with all financial characteristics variables, but the result for leverage is not significant.
Cross-sectional Regressions
In this sub-section, we report the results from cross-section regressions of the following specification in equation (6). EQ is an earnings management variable. FFO and DCEO are the percentages of shares owned by the founding family and CEO dummy. CVs are control variables, composed of ROA, leverage, sales growth, and labor productivity. DSize are firm size dummies (large-cap, mid-cap, and small-cap) defined based on the ranking in each year by book value of total assets, DSector is as defined in the Appendix 1, and DYear is the year dummies. by earnings management, we do not find evidence of this either. Hence, given the result from the previous univariate analysis, Hypothesis 1 is still maintained. As for the cross-term between FFO and DCEO, it is negative and shows some synergy effects of these variables concerning a decrease in earnings management, but it is not significant.
As for earnings variability (EBEISD), the slopes of FFO and DECO are positive at 0.012 and 0.086 and significant at the 5% level, which implies that the more shares owned by the family or, if the CEO is from the family, the higher the earnings variability.
The cross-term between FFO and DCEO is negative at -0.012 and may make earnings smoother. The result is significant.
As for smoothness, the slope of DCEO is positive, 0.065, and significant at the 1% level, which implies that if the CEO is from the family, the level of smoothness is lower, which is somewhat counterintuitive. For the cross-term between FFO and DCEO, it is negative at -0.002, and the result is significant.
In the case of REM, the magnitude of coefficients for both FFO and DCEO become much smaller. We find that the coefficient of family shares (FFO) explains the abnormal production cost (ABNPROD), which is negative and significant at -0.001. Additionally, the coefficient on abnormal expenditures (ABNEXP) is positive at 0.0004 and significant. Again, family firms do not conduct overproduction and are willing to spend necessary expenditures and do not boost earnings. The coefficient for abnormal expenditures of DCEO variable is positive at 0.005 and significant at the 5% level. As for the cross-terms between FFO and DCEO, these are all zero for real earnings management variables and are insignificant.
Overall, we find a tendency that CEOs from the founding family play a positive role to improve the earnings quality both on AEM and REM. The results support Hypothesis 1 overall. It means the family CEO is concerned with the reputation of the firm as reliable in terms of disclosure effort leading at the same time to increased socioemotional wealth. The latter may mean that the more shares held by founding families, the less attention will be paid to shareholders outside the family.
Further Analysis of Costs of Earnings Management
We have confirmed in Tables 2 to 5 that family firms have a general tendency to decrease their reported earnings by utilizing both AEM and REM strategies. These findings support our Hypothesis 1 and suggest that family firms are more concerned with the reputation of investors. Additionally, the magnitude of the income decrease using AEM strategies is greater than that using REM strategies, which supports Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 2.A.
The reason family firms utilize accruals-based strategies to a large extent to manage their earnings is worth exploring. One of the possible reasons to explain such family firm earnings management behavior is the ease in managing earnings. The potential cost of managing earnings using an AEM strategy is lower than the cost of an REM strategy.
More importantly, family firms may not want to incur economic cost by conducting REM strategies that will deter them from accumulating family socioemotional wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014) . This prediction led to Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 2.A.
In this subsection, we further compare the relative cost of earnings management: AEM versus REM, for which variables were defined in Section 5.2 Table 6 reports the cost of earnings management classified by three types of family and non-family firms.
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The results for AEM reveal that the choice of auditors is significantly less for all types of family firms at the 10% level, the number of analysts is significantly less for Type 1 and Type 2 firms at the 1% level, and the operating cycle is significantly less for Type 2 firms at the 10% level, but is longer for Type 1 and Type 3 firms although not significant. Accordingly, we conclude that earnings management will be easier for family firms from these three cost comparisons, except for a shorter operating cycle for Type 2 firms. For the number of analyst variables, Type 3 firms attract more analysts on average (2.644) versus non-family firms (2.541), although the difference is not significant. Moreover, Type 3 and Type 1 firms show a longer operating cycle than non-family firms but, again, the results are not significant.
For REM, market shares (MShare) are significantly lower for all types of family firms and, for Type 2, MShare is the lowest with 1.503% while the market share for Type 3 firms is 5.040%, comparable to 6.829% of non-family firms, although the difference is not significant. This implies that the cost of earnings management is higher for family firms. For the distance to default (DD) threshold point, all family firms have a significantly smaller likelihood of defaulting. 12 The largest likelihood of default is among Type 1 firms with a distance of 3.754. Type 2 and Type 3 firms show distances of 3.491 and 3.497, respectively, which is significantly larger than 3.312 for non-family firms. We find family firms are safer and, for that reason, the cost for upward earnings management will be less. Type 2 and Type 3 firms have higher effective tax rates, which
shows that the cost of earnings management is higher. Type 3 firms have lower effective marginal tax rates (Graham, 1996) with 29.769% versus 30.402% for non-family firms.
Accordingly, except for the distance to default (DD), the cost of REM for family firms is larger than for non-family firms.
Hence, for Hypothesis 2.A, we conclude that family firms choose AEM over REM.
We confirm this with a robustness check in the following two tables. For cost proxies for REM, the percentage of shares owned by the family are negatively correlated with market shares at -0.223 and positively correlated with distance to default and effective marginal tax rates at 0.067 and 0.083, respectively. The results for market share and marginal tax rates imply that the costs rise as more shares are owned by families. However, the observation for distance to default reveals that family firms for which a large proportion of stock is held by the founding family are more risk averse to avoid bankruptcy, which is consistent with the theory that a family seeks long-term sustainability and preservation of socioemotional wealth. Table 8 reports the results from regression analysis as in equation (6) 
In (6) (2012), other results for both
FFO and DCEO variables demonstrate that these variables reduce the cost of AEM because coefficients for the number of analysts are negative at -0.037 and -0.201, respectively, and those for operating cycles are positive at 0.137 and 1.701, although the coefficients for DCEO variable are not significant.
For REM, with the exception of distance to default, the costs will be higher because the coefficients for both FFO and DCEO variables for market shares are negative at -0.123 and -1.796, and the coefficients for effective marginal tax rates are positive at 0.004 and -0.543, respectively.
In sum, from the analyses in this section, we conclude that family firms in Japan choose AEM over REM (supporting Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 2.A) when more shares are owned by the founding family with a family CEO. Moreover, family firms, particularly when the CEO is not from the founding family (Type 2), tend to engage in a higher level of earnings management (rejecting Hypothesis 1) than non-family firms.
Summary and Conclusion
We investigated the degree of accrual-based earnings management and real activities-based earnings management using data for all family and non-family firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange from the year 2004 to the year 2011.
By employing univariate analysis, we found that the magnitude of income decrease using accruals-based strategies is greater for family firms compared to non-family firms, and REM measures are lower for family firms compared to non-family firms. From cross-section regressions, we found that the shares owned by the founding family (FFO) and CEO dummy (DCEO) do not affect the incremental level of earnings management. For the level of real activities-based earnings management, we found that family firm-related variables decrease levels of earnings management.
When we introduced various economic measures that are related to costs of earnings management, we found that family firms in Japan utilize more accrual-based earnings management than real activities-based earnings management by comparing cost differences, which is a new finding and reinforces the findings of Achleitner et al. (2014) for German family firms.
Our contribution is that this is the first study using Japanese data to investigate the level of accrual-based earnings management and real activities-based earnings management using the testing methodology by Zang (2012) and, moreover, based on the real authority theory by Aghion and Tirle (1997) . In contrast to conventional family firm research, we tested the original hypotheses by applying them to the three types of listed family firms in Japan and non-family firms.
The limitation of this research is that we have not investigated the differences across industries for three types of family firms, which is an avenue for future research. 
